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ABSTRACT
A recent report was published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission – Industry-
Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power 
Plants, NUREG/CR-6928. That report characterized industry performance (generally covering 
1998 – 2002) for 51 component types found in commercial nuclear power plants. For example, for 
emergency diesel generators, three failure modes were identified:  fail to start and reach rated 
speed and voltage, fail to load and run for one hour, and fail to run beyond one hour. Data from the 
U.S. industry contained in the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) 
database maintained by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations were used to evaluate the 
failure probabilities and rates for these failure modes, covering 1998 – 2002. The software 
package Reliability and Availability Database System (RADS) was used to search and process the 
EPIX data. In addition, train test and maintenance unavailability was characterized for 34 train 
types.  
As a follow-on effort to this report, several components will be analyzed in more detail 
each year. These detailed studies include more recent data and analyze various subcategories such 
as manufacturer, system, size and type (as applicable). In addition, engineering insights such as 
piece part contribution to each failure mode and failure cause will be determined. This paper 
summarizes the preliminary results for emergency diesel generators. EPIX data coverage was 
expanded to include 1998 – 2007 and reliability results were compared with unplanned demand 
performance (bus under voltage events requiring the emergency diesel generator to start, load and 
run) over the same period. In addition, performance by manufacturer was evaluated. Finally, piece 
part contributions and failure causes were determined for each failure mode.  
Key Words: component reliability, emergency diesel generator, train unavailability 
Disclaimer:  This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the 
United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any 
of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or 
responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, 
product, or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not 
infringe privately owned rights. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
A recent report was published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) – 
Industry-Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at U.S. Commercial 
Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-6928 [1]. That report characterized industry performance 
(generally covering 1998 – 2002) for 51 component types found in commercial nuclear power 
plants. Data from the U.S. industry contained in the Equipment Performance and Information 
Exchange (EPIX) database [2] maintained by The Institute for Nuclear Power Operations were 
used to evaluate the failure probabilities and rates for applicable failure modes, covering 1998 – 
2002. The software package Reliability and Availability Database System (RADS) [3] was used 
to search and process the EPIX data. In addition, train test and maintenance unavailability was 
characterized for 34 train types. 
As a follow-on effort to this report, several components will be analyzed in more detail 
each year. The purposes of these more detailed studies are the following: 
? Compare 1998 – 2002 performance with more recent data (2003 – 2007) 
? Compare EPIX data results (containing mostly test data) with unplanned demand 
performance over the same period 
? Generate new baselines using 1998 – 2007 data (if appropriate) 
? Identify important differences in performance within component subcategories such as 
system, manufacturer, size, type, and environment (as applicable) 
? Identify piece part contributions to and failure cause for each failure mode 
This paper summarizes the preliminary results of the detailed study of emergency diesel 
generators (EDGs). 
2 EDG COMPONENT BOUNDARY 
As defined in the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) Program [4], the EDG 
component boundary includes the diesel engine with all components in the exhaust path, 
electrical generator, generator exciter, output breaker, combustion air, lube oil systems, fuel oil 
system (local), starting compressed air system, and local instrumentation and control circuitry. 
The sequencer, room heating and ventilation, fuel system (extended), and service water system 
cooling (except for control of flow to heat exchanger) are excluded. Note that this differs from 
the definition used for the common-cause failure (CCF) database [5], where the sequencer is 
included within the EDG component boundary. Also, the NRC system study for EDGs [6] 
included the sequencer and room heating and ventilation. 
3 FAILURE MODES AND DATA COLLECTION 
The EDG failure modes include fail to start (FTS), fail to load and run for one hour 
(FTLR), and fail to run beyond one hour (FTR>1H). These failure modes were used in 
NUREG/CR-6928 and are similar to those used in the MSPI Program. There is some uncertainty 
concerning when the run hours should start to be counted; should they start as soon as the EDG 
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starts or should they start only after the output circuit breaker has closed? For this study, the run 
hours start as soon as the EDG is started, which is the way data have been reported in EPIX. 
Guidelines for determining whether a component event reported in EPIX is to be included 
in FTS, FTLR, or FTR>1H are similar to those used in the MSPI Program. In general, any 
circumstance in which the component is not able to meet the performance requirements defined 
in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is counted. This includes conditions revealed through 
testing, operational demands, unplanned demands, or discovery. Also, run failures that occur 
beyond the typical 24-hour mission time in PRAs are included. However, certain events are 
excluded: slow engine starting times that do not exceed the PRA success criteria, conditions that 
are annunciated immediately in the control room without a demand, and run events that are 
shown to not have caused an actual run failure within 24 hours. Also, events occurring during 
maintenance or post-maintenance testing that are related to the actual maintenance activities are 
excluded. Finally, in contrast to the MSPI Program, a general guideline on slow starting times is 
to include only those slow starts requiring more than 20 seconds as FTS events, similar to what 
was done for the CCF database and the EDG system study. (In the MSPI Program, most 
licensees chose to use technical specification requirements for fast starts as their success criteria 
– typically less than 10 seconds to start.) All of the EDG events within EPIX were reviewed to 
ensure that they were binned to the correct failure mode – FTS, FTLR, FTR>1H, or no failure. 
However, even given detailed descriptions of failure events, this binning still required some 
judgment and involves some uncertainty. 
Guidelines for counting demands and run hours are similar to those in the MSPI Program. 
Start and load/run demands include those resulting from tests, operational demands, and 
unplanned demands. Demands during maintenance and post-maintenance testing are excluded. 
Similarly, run hours include those from tests, operational demands, and unplanned demands. 
Note that the test demands and run hours dominate the totals, compared with operational and 
unplanned demands and run hours. 
4 NUREG/CR-6928 BASELINE PERFORMANCE FOR EDGS 
NUREG/CR-6928 provides the most recent estimates for U.S. commercial nuclear power 
plant EDG unreliability. That document analyzed EPIX data (processed by RADS) over 1998 – 
2002 to determine industry-average performance – component unreliability (UR) and train 
unavailability (UA) – centered about the year 2000. Table I summarizes the UR and UA data and 
resulting failure probability and rate distributions. FTS and FTLR are characterized by beta 
distributions, while FTR uses a gamma distribution. The resulting mean values for FTS, FTLR, 
and FTR>1H indicate improved performance compared with older historical estimates. 
Table I. EDG industry-average component UR and train UA from NUREG/CR-6928 
Failure 
Mode 
Events Demands 
or Hours 
Mean
(MLE)
(note a) 
Mean
(EB)
(note b) 
Units Distribution 
FTS 98 24206 4.05E-03 4.53E-03 1/d Beta (1.075, 236.2) 
FTLR 61 21342 2.86E-03 2.90E-03 1/d Beta (1.411, 486.6) 
FTR>1H 50 59875 8.35E-04 8.48E-04 1/h Gamma (2.010, 2370 h) 
Train UA NA NA 1.34E-02 NA 1/d Beta (3.586, 264.0) 
a. Maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) = events/demands or hours 
b. Parametric empirical Bayes estimate, assuming variable performance between plants [7] 
S.A. Eide, T. E. Wierman, and D.M. Rasmuson
Page 4 of 12 
Also presented in Table I is the NUREG/CR-6928 estimate for EDG train UA resulting 
from test and maintenance outages while the plant is in critical operation. That estimate 
represents an average of 219 EDG trains, using MSPI basis document UA data covering 2002 – 
2004. The mean UA of 1.34E-2 represents an increase compared with Reactor Oversight Process 
Safety System Unavailability (ROP SSU) [8] results over 1998 – 2002 (approximately 9.0E-3, 
with fault exposure hours removed). This increase is due to both increased online maintenance in 
recent years and differences in reporting guidelines. For example, the ROP SSU did not include 
EDG overhauls performed while the plant is in critical operation, while the MSPI does include 
this type of outage. 
5 EDG UPDATE RESULTS USING 1998 – 2007 DATA 
NUREG/CR-6928 EDG component UR and train UA estimates are based on EPIX data for 
1998 – 2002 (and EDG train UA data for 2002 – 2004).  In contrast, this EDG study expands the 
data to include 2003 through 2007. This doubles the data collection period. Trend plots for FTS, 
FTLR, and FTR>1H are presented in Figures 1 through 3, covering 1998 – 2007. Estimates for 
each year are Bayesian updates of a constrained noninformative prior using only data for that 
year. The downward trend for FTS is not significant (p-value of 0.075), using 0.05 as the value 
for significance. Also, the upward trends for FTLR and FTR>1H are not significant (p-values of 
0.32 and 0.43, respectively). 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0.00E+00
5.88E-03 Period Est Fit
1998 4.25E-03 3.54E-03
1999 3.02E-03 3.41E-03
2000 3.14E-03 3.28E-03
2001 3.10E-03 3.16E-03
2002 2.24E-03 3.04E-03
2003 3.77E-03 2.93E-03
2004 3.04E-03 2.82E-03
2005 2.68E-03 2.71E-03
2006 2.53E-03 2.61E-03
2007 2.58E-03 2.52E-03
Est and 90%
confidence interval
Fitted rate
90% confidence band
on fitted rate
Trend Analysis
Rule: EDG FTS
25 JUN 2008
Figure 1. EDG FTS trend plot (1998 – 2007) 
Detailed Study of EDG Performance Using EPIX/RADS Database 
Page 5 of 12 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0.00E+00
8.06E-03 Period Est Fit
1998 3.56E-03 3.15E-03
1999 2.57E-03 3.27E-03
2000 3.08E-03 3.40E-03
2001 4.78E-03 3.53E-03
2002 5.18E-03 3.66E-03
2003 3.36E-03 3.80E-03
2004 2.34E-03 3.94E-03
2005 5.07E-03 4.09E-03
2006 3.20E-03 4.25E-03
2007 5.92E-03 4.41E-03
Est and 90%
confidence interval
Fitted rate
90% confidence band
on fitted rate
Trend Analysis
Rule: EDG FTLR
24 JUN 2008
Figure 2. EDG FTLR trend plot (1998 – 2007) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0.00E+00
2.07E-03 Period Est Fit
1998 5.22E-04 6.14E-04
1999 6.39E-04 6.44E-04
2000 8.03E-04 6.76E-04
2001 4.92E-04 7.09E-04
2002 1.02E-03 7.45E-04
2003 7.87E-04 7.81E-04
2004 1.25E-03 8.20E-04
2005 1.20E-03 8.61E-04
2006 2.87E-04 9.04E-04
2007 1.45E-03 9.48E-04
Est and 90%
confidence interval
Fitted rate
90% confidence band
on fitted rate
Trend Analysis
Rule: EDG FTR
24 JUN 2008
Figure 3. EDG FTR>1H trend plot (1998 – 2007) 
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The trend plot for EDG train UA is presented in Figure 4. This plot includes ROP SSU data 
for 1998 – 2002 and MSPI train UA data for 2002 – 2007. (Data for 2002 include a mix of the 
two because not all of the plants reported MSPI train UA data for 2002.) There is a step increase 
in the train UA around 2002, which is the result of switching from one database to another, with 
each having differing reporting guidelines. Therefore, a trend line is not presented. A major 
reason for the jump is believed to be the inclusion of EDG overhaul hours in the MSPI data (if 
performed during critical operation). However, some of the jump is believed to be the result of 
increased maintenance other than overhauls during critical operation. 
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Figure 4. EDG train UA trend plot (1998 – 2007) 
EDG industry-average performance using the entire 1998 – 2007 period is summarized in 
Table II. Results are compared with the NUREG/CR-6928 results using 1998 – 2002 data in the 
table. The new FTS mean of 3.12E-3/d is lower than the NUREG/CR-6928 mean of 4.53E-3/d. 
However, the new FTLR mean is 4.06E-3/d, compared with 2.90E-3 from NUREG/CR-6928. 
The reasons for these changes are not clearly known yet; however, they may be just the result of 
some recategorization of EDG failure events (moving FTS events into FTLR). FTR results are 
similar for both data periods. 
Table II includes an additional row for FTR>1H results in which the first hour of EDG 
operation has been removed. The MSPI Program includes this first hour of operation is its FTR 
calculations. NUREG/CR-6928 also included this first hour of operation in its FTR>1H 
calculations (based on the mistaken assumption that the EPIX EDG run hours had excluded this 
first hour of operation). The most appropriate approach for estimating FTR>1H rates is to 
exclude this first hour of operation. The final version of this detailed EDG study will recommend 
that this approach be used, along with its associated results. 
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Table II. EDG industry-average performance using data from 1998 – 2007 
Failure 
Mode 
Events Demands 
or Hours 
Mean
(MLE)
(note a) 
Mean
(EB)
(note b) 
Units Distribution NUREG/ 
CR-6928 
Mean (EB) 
1998 - 2002 
Data
FTS 137 45231 3.03E-03 3.12E-03 1/d Beta (3.508, 1122) 4.53E-03 
FTLR 154 38947 3.95E-03 4.06E-03 1/d Beta (2.413, 591.8) 2.90E-03 
FTR>1H 104 123296 8.43E-04 8.41E-04 1/h Gamma (13.10, 15570 h) 8.48E-04 
FTR>1H
(note c) 
104 78065 1.33E-03 Unknown 
at this 
time 
1/h Gamma (10, 7519 h) 1.40E-03 
Train UA NA NA 1.42E-02 NA 1/d Beta (2.600, 180.5) 1.34E-02 
a. Maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) = events/demands or hours 
b. Empirical Bayes estimate, assuming variable performance between plants 
c. FTR>1H results after removing first hour of operation per demand. These results are MLEs because the RADS 
software has not yet been modified to correct the run hours. The alpha parameter for the gamma distribution is a 
guess at this time. 
6 COMPARISON OF EPIX RESULTS WITH UNPLANNED DEMANDS 
Because the EPIX EDG data are dominated by test demands (over 95% of the demands are 
typically from tests), an ongoing concern is whether these mostly test data adequately represent 
EDG performance during unplanned demands. To answer this question, licensee event reports 
(LERs) were reviewed to identify actual unplanned EDG demands involving bus under voltage 
conditions. Such events require the associated EDG to start, load onto the bus and power the bus 
until normal power is recovered to the bus. There are additional EDG unplanned demands in 
which a bus under voltage condition did not exist. In those cases, the EDG did not have to load 
and power the bus. Such unplanned demands do not fully exercise the mission of the EDGs and 
therefore were not counted. 
The EDG unplanned demand data covering 1998 – 2007 are summarized in Table III. 
Unlike the EPIX data over the same period (45231 demands), there were only 223 unplanned 
demands associated with bus under voltage conditions. (The average EDG run time per 
unplanned demand is 8.6 h, including the first hour of operation.) In addition, compared with 395 
EPIX EDG failures, there were only nine failures from unplanned demands. Of these nine, four 
were quickly and easily recovered such that they could load and power the bus. Comparisons in 
Table III include cases using the nine failures and the five unrecovered failures. Sequencer 
results are also presented in the table for completeness, although the sequencer is outside of the 
EDG component boundary. 
Consistency between the unplanned demand data and industry-average performance from 
EPIX (from Table II) was evaluated using the predictive distribution approach outlined in the 
Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment, NUREG/CR-6823, 
Sections 6.2.3.5 and 6.3.3.4 [7]. Simulation is required. For FTS, the unplanned demand data 
were aggregated at the plant level (failures and demands). Assuming each plant can have a 
different failure probability, the industry-average distribution (from Table II) was sampled for 
each plant. The predicted number of FTS events for each plant was evaluated using the binomial 
distribution with the plant-specific failure probability and its associated number of demands. 
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Then the total number of predicted failures was obtained by summing the individual plant 
results. This process was repeated 1000 times (Latin hypercube sampling), each time obtaining a 
total number of predicted failures. The 1000 sample results were ordered from high to low. Then 
the actual number of unplanned demand failures observed (listed in Table III) was compared 
with this ordered sample to determine the probability of observing this number of failures or 
greater. If the probability was greater than 0.05, then the unplanned demand performance was 
considered to be consistent with the industry-average distribution obtained from the EPIX data 
analysis.
Table III. EDG unplanned demand performance comparison with industry-average 
performance from EPIX data 
Consistency of EDG Unplanned Demand Data (without recovery considered) with Industry-Average Performance 
Data Set Failure Modes Plants Demands or 
Hours 
Failures Expected 
Failures 
Probability 
of  
? Failures 
Consistent with 
Industry-Average 
Performance? 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTS 73 223 2 0.7 0.15 Yes 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTLR 73 223 3 0.9 0.07 Yes 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTR 73 1745.6 h 4 2.3 0.20 Yes 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTS, FTLR, 
and FTR 
73 223 and 
1745.6 h 
9 3.9 0.01 No 
        
Consistency of EDG Unplanned Demand Data (with recovery considered) with Industry-Average Performance 
Data Set Failure Modes Plants Demands or 
Hours 
Failures Expected 
Failures 
Probability 
of  
? Failures 
Consistent with 
Industry-Average 
Performance? 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTS 73 223 1 0.7 0.48 Yes 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTLR 73 223 2 0.9 0.22 Yes 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTR 73 1745.6 h 2 2.3 0.67 Yes 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTS, FTLR, 
and FTR 
73 223 and 
1745.6 h 
5 3.9 0.33 Yes 
        
Consistency of Sequencer Unplanned Demand Data with Industry-Average Performance 
Data Set Failure Modes Plants Demands Failures Expected 
Failures 
Probability 
of  
? Failures 
Consistent with 
Industry-Average 
Performance? 
Unplanned 
Demands 
FTOP 73 223 2 0.7 0.18 Yes 
Unplanned 
Demands 
(recovery 
considered) 
FTOP 73 223 1 0.7 0.53 Yes 
The consistency checks using unplanned demand data without recovery considered indicate 
that each failure mode (FTS, FTLR, and FTR>1H) is consistent with its industry-average 
distribution from Table II. However, because each unplanned demand failure total is higher than 
the expected number of failures, when all three failure modes are combined, the result lies at the 
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1% portion of the predictive distribution. This indicates a strong inconsistency. However, when 
recovery is considered, the results for individual failure modes and all three combined are 
consistent with the results using EPIX data from the same period. Finally, the sequencer 
unplanned demand performance is consistent with the industry-average distribution in 
NUREG/CR-6928 with and without recovery considered. 
7 EDG PERFORMANCE BY MANUFACTURER 
Table IV presents the results of the evaluation of EDG performance by manufacturer. EPIX 
contains information on EDG manufacturers, but it appears that over the years some 
manufacturers have changed names or have been acquired by other manufacturers. Therefore, in 
order to identify the original manufacturer, the EPIX information was supplemented by other 
EDG reports. The results are a consistency check against the industry-average distributions in 
Table II. The comparison was made for the combination of all three failure modes. Two 
manufacturers’ EDG performances lie in the upper 95% of the predictive distribution (superior 
performance). Two lie in the lower 5% (degraded performance), but these manufacturers involve 
very few EDGs, so the data are limited. The rest of the manufacturers lie within the 5% to 95% 
interval and are consistent with the industry-average performance. 
Table IV. EDG performance by manufacturer 
EDG Manufacturer Performance Consistency with Industry-Average Performance - FTS, FTLR, and FTR 
Combined 
Manufacturer Code EDGs Actual 
Failures 
Expected
Failures 
Probability ?
Actual
Failures 
Consistent with 
Industry-Average 
Performance? 
(note a) 
Worthington Corp WC 4 17 7.3 0.00 No
SAC/Compair Luchard SC 1 5 1.7 0.04 No
TransAmerica DeLaval TD 20 47 40.8 0.25 Yes
Nordberg NB 8 21 18.2 0.32 Yes 
Jeumont Schndr JS 2 8 7.7 0.49 Yes
ALCO Power AP 24 47 53.4 0.65 Yes
Fairbanks Morse/Colt FM/C 65 109 127.9 0.93 Yes
Electro Motive/General Motors EM/GM 68 95 133.1 1.00 Yes
Cooper Bessemer CB 31 46 73.0 1.00 Yes
    
Totals   223 395 463.2   
a. If the probability of observing the actual failures or greater is > 0.05, then the manufacturer performance is 
considered to be consistent with the industry-average performance. 
8 EDG PIECE PART CONTRIBUTION TO FAILURE MODES 
EDG piece part contributions to the three failure modes are presented in Figures 5 through 
7. The piece parts are similar to those used in the CCF database. For FTS, instrumentation and 
control and the generator piece parts have the highest percentage contributions to failures. FTLR 
high contributors include the breaker and instrumentation and control. Finally, FTR high 
contributors include the cooling, engine, fuel oil, and instrumentation and control. 
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Figure 5. EDG FTS breakdown by piece part 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper summarizes preliminary results of a detailed study of EDG component UR and 
train UA, using EPIX data covering 1998 – 2007. This is an update of results in NUREG/CR-
6928, which used EPIX data covering 1998 – 2002. Addition of the newer data and a detailed 
review of failure events resulted in a lower FTS probability and higher FTLR probability 
compared with NUREG/CR-6928. The FTR>1H rates and train UA probabilities are similar. 
However, the FTR>1H rate should be recalculated using only those run hours beyond the first 
hour of operation. 
Comparison of EDG unplanned demand performance obtained from a review of LERs with 
EPIX results (based mainly on test results) indicates that the unplanned demand performance is 
consistent with the EPIX results if recovery is considered for the unplanned demands. However, 
if recovery is not considered, the unplanned demand performance is significantly worse than the 
EPIX results. (The EPIX data do not consider recovery. All events must be reported, even though 
some might have been recovered.) 
Additional engineering insights include a ranking of EDG manufacturers by component UR 
and piece part contributions to the FTS, FTLR, and FTR>1H failure modes. This information 
may be helpful to both NRC inspectors and industry.
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Figure 6. EDG FTLR breakdown by piece part 
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Figure 7. EDG FTR breakdown by piece part 
S.A. Eide, T. E. Wierman, and D.M. Rasmuson
Page 12 of 12 
10 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This work was sponsored by the NRC, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The authors 
are grateful to INPO for providing the EPIX data, upon which most of this work is based. 
11 REFERENCES 
1. S.A. Eide et al., Industry-Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at 
U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-6928 (INL/EXT-06-11119), U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, February 2007. 
2. Equipment  Performance and Information Exchange System (EPIX): Reporting 
Requirements, INPO 98-001, Revision 6, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, December 
2007.
3. D.M. Rasmuson, T.E. Wierman, and K.J. Kvarfordt, “An Overview of the Reliability and 
Availability Data System (RADS),” International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis PSA’05, American Nuclear Society, Inc., 2005. 
4. Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, NEI 99-02, Revision 5, Nuclear 
Energy Institute, July 2007. 
5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Reactor Operational Experience Results and 
Databases, System Studies,” http://nrcoe.inel.gov/results. 
6. G.M. Grant et al., Reliability Study: Emergency Diesel Generator Power System, 1987 – 
1993, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-5500 (INEL-95/0035), Vol. 5, 
September 1999. 
7. C.L. Atwood et al., Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment,
NUREG/CR-6823, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, September 
2003.
8. Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, NEI 99-02, Revision 0, Nuclear 
Energy Institute, March 2000. 
